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SOME BUGABOOS IN PRE-TRIAL
ALFRED P. MURRAH*

In view of all that has been written and said for pre-trial conference,' it seems rather superfluous, if not presumptuous, to undertake
to add to or enlarge upon the subject. Indeed, it might be efficacious
to heed Judge Clark's 2 suggestion that the procedural cause would be
better served "if something could be done to stop us judges ... from
publishing what we say" 3 about the Rules. But even at the risk of
overstating the case, those who have enlisted for the duration' never
forego an opportunity to strike a blow on the side of simplified
procedure.
Pre-trial practice has been acclaimed "one of the greatest contributions to the ministry of justice," and it has been condemned as a
"curse," a "joke," a "waste of time and money," and a "means of
sand-bagging litigants into a settlement."
The wide divergence of views on this important subject deserves
some analysis. Those who condemn the practice may be classified
roughly into two categories: (1) those of the profession who are
historically and congenitally opposed to any procedural change on
the grounds that the old tried and true is good enough and anything
new or different is heresy; (2) those who have been the unfortunate
victims of the misuse or abuse of the rule by judges who misconceive
its real function in the procedural scheme.
To those who oppose the practice as an innovation requiring new
techniques, it seems sufficient to say that there is nothing new, novel
or ingenious about a pre-trial conference unless, of course, it can be
said that applied common sense in trial practice is new and novel.
Indeed, some of our clients would doubtless agree with this latter
proposition.
There can be nothing radically innovative about the practice of
calling counsel for the litigants into a conference with the trial judge
after the issues have been joined and discovery is complete, for the
purpose of further defining the issues in the light of practiced dis* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; Chairman
of the Pre-Trial Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

1. See, e.g., Nnvims, PRE-ThrAL 309-19 (1950); A.B.A. SEcTroN
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Report of Committee on Pre-TrialProcedureapp. A (1950);
Murrah, Pre-Trial Procedure-A Statement of its Essentials, 14 F.R.D. 417,
441-46 (1954). See also Demonstrations of the Pretrial Conference, 11 F.R.D.
3 (1952); Pre-Trial Clinic, 4 F.R.D. 35 (1946).
2. Charles E. Clark, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit; Reporter to the United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee
of Rules on Civil Procedure; Chairman of the Permanent National Judicial
Conference Committee on the Rules of Procedure.
3. The Practical Operation of Federal Discovery---A Symposium on the
Use of Depositions and Discovery under the Federal Rules, 12 F.R.D. 131
(1952).
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covery. Quite apart from considerations of efficiency, it is vitally

important to a just decision that the case should not proceed to trial
upon a welter of issues-some genuine, some frivolous, some material,
and some immaterial. We know, of course, that even under fact
pleadings, much of the fatty tissue of a law suit survives the gamut
of all recognized formal preliminary motions, and that many times
the real issue in a law suit is reached only by the cumbersome method
of trial and error, while a jury sits in the jury box and busy litigants
and witnesses restlessly loaf in the corridors.
Given its proper place in the procedural scheme, there can be
no doubt of the utility of pre-trial conference as a common-sense
device for securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
litigation. That, we must agree, is the sole object and the only
justification for adjective law.
The first declared purpose of a pre-trial is to simplify and attempt
to agree upon the issues in a law suit. Opposition has been expressed
to the policy of requiring counsel to unequivocally commit himself
to the issues to be tried for the reason that subsequent development
of the facts may completely change the complexion of the law suit,
and that it is unjust to cast the suit into an inflexible mold before the
4
commencement of the trial.
In the first place, the proper use of discovery available under federal
and most state rules affords ample opportunity for the development
of sufficient facts to enable the parties to define the issues with a
reasonable degree of certainty. In the second place, one of the great
virtues of pre-trial is its own simplicity and flexibility. It was never
intended to irrevocably bind the parties to the course of a law suit.
If new and unexpected issues develop in the trial of the case, there
is certainly nothing in the rule to prevent the judge from altering
or modifying the pre-trial order or agreement in order that the case
may be decided upon its merits. And indeed it is the inescapable duty
of the judge to vouchsafe that right to all litigants.5
The issues having been thus defined by a realistic appraisal of the
facts through the proper use of discovery, there certainly can be no
valid objection to considering the necessity or the advisability of
amending the pleadings to conform to those issues. We know that
ofttimes a frank appraisal of facts in the light of discovery eliminates
many issues raised by the pleadings or gives rise to new issues which
often necessitate reshaping and redirecting the entire suit.
4. See the comments of Mr. E. E. Thompson in Tilbury, Pre-Trial Con-

ference in the Kansas City Area, 21 U. OF KAx. Crry L. Rnv. 77, 80 (1952).

5. E.g., Smith Contracting Corp. v. Trojan Const. Co., 192 F.2d 234, 236
(10th Cir. 1951); Pepper v. Truitt, 158 F.2d 246, 251 (10th Cir. 1946).
6. For concrete examples, see Dow, The Pre-Trial Conference, 41 Ky. L.J.
363, 366 (1953).
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We know that complaints are usually drawn from information
obtained from the client who is certainly not disposed to understate
his case. Answers and counterclaims are likewise made from information which often does not bear up under the searchlights of
discovery. And so, as a practical matter, the real purpose of pre-trial
is to develop the issues from investigatory processes and frame the
pleadings in conformity therewith. This is done in the pre-trial by a
full and free discussion of the case by counsel under the patient guidance of the court. All of this contemplates the cooperation of the
lawyers with the court, and it presupposes that the trial judge is
more than a mere umpire, but a functionary of the administration
of justice. The function of a pre-trial judge is to "actively . . . guide
and direct the conference to produce a pre-trial order which will
strip the case to its essentials as they have been defined therein
and will clearly set forth the factual and legal contentions of the
parties upon the issues to be decided at the trial."7 From a sifting
of the issues clear-cut questions of law and fact inevitably emerge.
In the words of a distinguished trial judge, "narrowing of the issues
actually to be tried eliminates an incalculable amount of unnecessary
and purposeless preparation both upon the law and in the marshaling
of evidence."8
A narrowing of the issues of law and fact gives the judge a grasp
of the law suit; it enables him to discern what troublesome questions
of law will confront him in the ultimate decision. This affords him
an opportunity to ask for pre-trial briefs on the questions so that
when the case is tried he will have an intelligent understanding of
the legal problems, thus greatly reducing any likelihood of error.
Ofttimes preliminary decisions on questions of law greatly affect the
ultimate course of the litigation. They enable court and counsel
to prepare and proceed intelligently and efficiently. To those who
complain that fore-knowledge is conducive to pre-judging, it should
be said that in multiple-judge jurisdictions with a central calendar
system, the pre-trial judge does not try the case. But even so, knowledge of the facts and law is prerequisite to a decision, and who will
say that the longer the court is kept in ignorance of the facts and
law the better chance the litigants have to procure a competent
decision?
The legal and factual issues having been realistically defined, who
could object to exploring the possibility of obtaining admissions of
fact and of documents about which there can be no real dispute?
Some judges and lawyers apparently entertain the idea that one of

7.

MANuAL OF PRETRIAL PRACTICE OF THE NEW JERSEY SuPREPIE COURT

3

(1953).
8. Delehant, Pre-Trial Conferences in the Federal District Courts: Their
Value for Counsel and for Judges, 35 J. Am. J . Soc. 70, 73 (1951).
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the functions of a pre-trial conference is to secure the admission of
controversial facts, and this misconception has made many fine trial
lawyers chary of the pre-trial conference. It is of first importance
to remember that the pre-trial conference is neither the time nor the
place for the development or ascertainment of controverted facts.
It should always be remembered that pre-trial "should be combined
and integrated with discovery procedure as a part of a single mechanism," 9 and that adequate discovery under available rules is essential
to an effectual pre-trial. Every lawyer likes to flavor his law suit
with the testimony of his own witnesses on crucial matters, and
indeed he has a right to do so. But he has no right to insist upon
formal proof of matters and things about which there is no real basis
for dispute, or of documents, the authenticity of which is easily ascertainable before trial.'0
The agreement on the number of expert witnesses at pre-trial
may greatly expedite the preparation of the case for trial as well as
shorten the trial of the case to the economic advantage of all parties.
It has been suggested that counsel usually agree upon such matters
in advance of trial, but we know as a practical matter that much
time and money are wasted by the extravagant use of expert witnesses in trials where the parties apparently proceed upon the premise
that the truth lies in sheer weight of numbers. The judge has no way
of avoiding these pitfalls unless he has a preview of what is to come,
and the pre-trial conference is certainly an appropriate place to
decide matters of this kind after the issues have been defined and
agreements have been reached on undisputed matters.
Some complain that pre-trial deprives them of the weapon of
surprise to the detriment of their client's cause. This complaint assumes the premise that a law suit is a sporting contest with "no holds
barred." It is based upon what we hope is a false notion of the end
of the law. The pre-trial is, to be sure, based upon the philosophy
that a court room is not an arena for the exhibition of forensic
gladiators; rather that it is a place dedicated to the quest for truth and
simple justice, and that search is aided by a sane and scientific approach to the solution of the legal controversy. In the language of a
distinguished member of the bar, the pre-trial conference, properly
conducted, gives the lawyer "a better chance to give a satisfactory
answer to the three questions uppermost in his client's mind, namely:
What will it cost? How long will it take? And what are my chances
of success?"''"
9. The comment of John W. Wfllis in The Practical Operation of Federal
10. Nims, Some Comments on the Relation of Pre-Trial to the Rules of
Evidence, 5 VAND. L. RBv. 581 (1952).
11. Troutman, Pre-Trial Conferences, 4 M1EmcEa L. REv. 302, 311 (1953).
Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 131, 164 (1952).
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Undoubtedly the principal and most well-founded complaint against
pre-trial is its use as a means of "sandbagging" litigants into settlement of the case. Unfortunately it is true that many well-intentioned
judges entertain the notion that the principal purpose and function
of pre-trial is to induce the parties to arrive at a settlement. This
is particularly true in jurisdictions overburdened with personal injury litigation. In some rare instances it has been justified as a
desperate effort to unclog a docket hopelessly in arrears. But the call
of the calendar for the purpose of influencing counsel to arrive at a
settlement of the case was never the intended function of a pre-trial
conference. Indeed, pre-trial in its proper sense contemplates a trial
of the case on its merits. It is intended to condition the case for an
efficient and economical trial.
2
A pre-trial is not a market place for trading in accident values.1
The real function of a pre-trial is to assure every litigant his full
day in court; not to deprive him of that day by coercing him to settle
his law suit before trial. It is true, however, that in the natural
course of things, a successful pre-trial does result in the settlement
of many law suits. But settlements should be only the natural
by-products of a narrowing of the issues and the ascertainment of
uncontroverted facts.
An effective pre-trial enables the lawyer to look at his law suit
in the light of realities stripped of the gloss of his client's self-righteousness. It enables him to evaluate his client's cause in the light
of facts which he has developed by the use of discovery. It furnishes
a hospitable climate for a conciliatory approach under the firm judicious hand of a judge who knows how to suggest without coercive effect.
In the last analysis, the success of pre-trial depends upon an understanding of its fundamental purpose as an integral part of a procedural system designed to bring justice within the reach of all.
12. David W. Peck, The Pillarof Justice (Jan. 14, 1952) (an address delivered by Judge Peck, Presiding Justice, Appellate Division, First Department, Supreme Court of New York).

